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Abstract
Conflicts over the equitability of transboundary natural resource conservation and
management schemes have created barriers to effective policy implementation and
practice. In seeking to overcome these barriers in the context of progressing
transboundary oceanic fisheries conservation, we explore the divide between equity as
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defined in principle and as applied in practice in international policy and law.
Searching for cross-cutting lessons and themes, we first review multilateral
environmental agreements to see how equity is commonly being defined, understood,
and then applied in principle. From this analysis, we identify common elements that
can facilitate the conceptual framing and application of equitable principles in
practice. Framed within these elements, we then explore how applications of equitable
principles have performed in two current transboundary conservation and
management case studies in regional fisheries management and international climate
change policy. From this analysis, we conclude with some lessons learned which show
that finding solutions to equity-driven barriers to transboundary conservation, while
challenging, are well within our existing capacity to develop and execute.

Introduction
Oceanic fisheries conservation and management agreements have broadly promoted
benefit-driven, cooperative, and inter-generational approaches to resource use for
decades. This is also the case for other transboundary terrestrial natural resources
such as forests, rangelands, river basins, and clean air. These inclusive approaches are
informed by the language and intent of numerous well-established international
environmental agreements for sustainable development (e.g., LOSC 1982; UNCED
1992; UNMDG 2000; UNCSD 2012). However, best-written intentions can translate
poorly into effective practice when it comes to the sustainable use of transboundary
resources for which usage is rival, exclusion is difficult, and benefits and outcomes are
shared (Rose et al. 1998; Berkes et al. 2003; Tonn 2003; Lodge et al. 2007; Ostrom
2007; Grafton et al. 2010; Sommerville et al. 2010).
Understanding what makes one conservation or management scheme a success in
practice while another fails is a broadly-recognised challenge in the complex and
integrated whole of human and natural systems; i.e., social-ecological systems (SESs)
(Berkes and Folke 1998). In terrestrial systems, a growing body of research recognizes
that critical linkages between many of the successes and failures of environmental
conservation action in SESs lie in the ability to relate key human social interactions to
conservation outcomes (Gunderson et al. 1995; Berkes et al. 2003; Folke 2007;
Ostrom 2007; Bodin and Crona 2009; Vollan and Ostrom 2010; Dandy et al. 2014).
Similar linkages and lessons are now being explored in the marine environment (e.g.,
see Pollnac et al. 2010; López-Angarita et al. 2014; Österblom et al. 2013).
One key social interaction is the behaviour of resource stakeholders in response to the
perceived fairness, or equity, of a given conservation and management scheme. These
stakeholders are individuals, groups, or nation States with a direct interest in an
environmental good or service. They can affect or be affected by the actions of others
with similar interests. Global asymmetries in wealth, power, capacity, and need mean
that the benefits and costs associated with tackling transboundary sustainable
resource management and conservation challenges are experienced disproportionately
among these diverse stakeholders. This disproportionality is acutely felt in the
distribution of income, revenue, and livelihood cost burdens associated with imposing
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and observing limits on scarce and shared resources. In turn, this can create conflicts
between stakeholders throughout the natural resources. These conflicts are capable of
creating a genuine barrier to achieving timely and effective conservation outcomes.
While different shared transboundary resources have evident physical differences and
exist across scales of governance, they can still share similarities in their broader
human use characteristics. In seeking innovative solutions to these barriers to
conservation, it is worthwhile exploring the efforts to equitably manage and conserve
in broadly similar transboundary resource use environments. Pursuing one of many
potential avenues of investigation in this regard, this paper focuses on shared
transboundary resource use at an international, nation State-level scale. By applying
an international law and policy perspective, it may be possible to identify valuable
conceptual parallels, differences, and insights from analyses of principles in
international law and shared conservation and management efforts. Analysis
outcomes could in turn inform the further discourse necessary to develop more robust
and equitable resource policy and governance arrangements.
We apply this perspective to explore two international transboundary resource use
case studies that are currently grappling with equity issues as a barrier to their
effective conservation and management. The first case study looks at the regulatory
efforts made to equitably conserve and manage shared and highly migratory
transboundary oceanic tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).
The second case study provides a useful counterpoint from outside the maritime
domain and briefly examines international regulatory efforts to equitably abate
European greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Setting up the context for this analysis,
we first look at how equity’s concepts are being defined, understood, and then applied
in international environmental resource law and policy. Shifting from principle to
practice, we then focus on comparing the regulatory efforts of both case studies. This
analysis is followed by a discussion of some of the ‘lessons learned’ from these
approaches, with a particular focus on applications in transboundary marine fisheries
management.

Defining equity: how do we know when ‘fair is
fair’?
Concepts of equity, also interchangeably referred to as ‘fairness’ (Franck 1995; Shue
1999; Soltau 2009), have played a role in shaping human social norms for millennia.
These social norms are the customary ‘rules’ that govern both prescribed and
proscribed behavior in a given societal group and in a given social context (Bicchieri
and Muldoon 2014). Common terminologies associated with ‘lay’ definitions of equity
include ‘non-discrimination’, ‘fairness’, ‘impartiality’, and ‘playing by the rules’.
Bronfenbrenner (1973) broadly defined equity as an ethical judgement consistent with
socially-established principles of justice.
More technical and practicable definitions of equity are subject to much ongoing
philosophical, political and legal debate; what is clear is that equity is a complex
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concept with a definition, intent, and application that varies depending on multiple
situational and interpretive factors (Ringius et al. 2002; Shue 1996; Shelton 2007;
Soltau 2009). Despite this recognised complexity and lack of a clear and unifying
definition for ‘equity’, equitable concepts have persisted in the language of multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) for decades (Shelton 2007). These international
laws and regulatory policies provide a commonly accepted operational framework for
addressing cooperation, compliance, and the appropriate use of international
transboundary resources.

Equity concepts in international environmental law
While direct references to equity are few, much of the ‘equity-themed’ language in
major terrestrial and aquatic MEA’s refers to a need to avoid exacerbating the
contextual disparities in circumstance between developed and developing countries
both present and future (See examples: UNCHE 1972; LOSC 1982; UNCED 1992;
UNFCCC 1994; UNFSA 1995). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), for example, obliges developed countries to take the lead in
protecting the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations “on the
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities” (Art. 3 (1), UNFCCC 1994).
Some MEA’s recognise that equitable international policy approaches should take
specific vulnerable groups into account. For example, the United Nations “Fish Stocks
Agreement” Art. 24 (1, 2) (UNFSA 1995) requires parties to take into account the
special requirements of developing States when adopting conservation and
management measures, with particular references to food security, dependent and
indigenous communities, and the need to ensure that measures do not transfer
disproportionate burdens of conservation action on to developing States.
Equitable concepts are also present in international dispute settlement, but have yet to
be exercised in practice (Shelton 2007). Article 38 (2) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, provides that the Court may decide
cases ex aequo et bono (i.e., from equity and conscience) “if the parties agree
thereto” (Art. 38 (2), ICJ 1945).

Core elements of equity in transboundary natural
resource policy
Responsibility, rights, and justice intersect to frame discussions about what equity is
understood to mean in a given context and by whom, how it is used to inform
decision-making, and why a given action, outcome, or context is considered
‘equitable’. This section focuses primarily on the distributive dimension of these
elements.
Responsibility plays a critical role in apportioning accountability and assigning blame
for action or inaction in resource conservation and management (Ringius et al. 2002).
Assigned responsibility (i.e., a term which is generally synonymous with obligation or
duty in international environmental law and policy) is associated with established
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international legal obligations such as ‘duty of care’ (Arbour 2008; Müller et al. 2009),
a ‘duty to cooperate’ (e.g., such as through ‘good neighbourliness’ principles), a duty to
avoid causing harm (e.g., such as through the precautionary principle) or to remediate
harms (e.g., such as the polluter pays principle), a duty not to intervene in the
domestic affairs of other States, and a duty to fulfil agreed-upon commitments ‘in
good faith’ (United Nations 1970). Responsibility requires States, through the
application of these international legal principles, to reconcile potentially
incompatible or damaging interests peacefully and in good faith, and to remediate
when harm has already taken place through their actions.
Rights represent a guarantee of freedoms and entitlements as well as of permissible
actions (Wenar 2011). A product of prescriptive social norms, the ‘rules’ of rights
interact with the ‘rules’ of responsibility to assist in procedural and substantive
interpretations of what is ‘fair’ in a given context.
Looking at legal rights of conduct in an international transboundary resource context,
the rival and often non-excludable nature of shared resource use means that clear
stakeholder rights of privilege, power, claim, and immunity (for more on these
theorised ‘base elements’ of rights see Hohfeld (1919)) can be difficult to identify or
assert without overlaps and conflict. Conflicts over upstream and downstream
transboundary watercourse use illustrate this challenge well (See example: Case
concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia 1997). Because
asserting a right gives no guidance on how it should be prioritised against another in
cases of conflict, issues are often resolved by negotiating additional contractual and
reciprocal rights and responsibilities through bilateral or multilateral treaties (e.g.,
such as the (EU Common Fisheries Policy 1970); (USA-Canada Air Quality Agreement
1991)). Occasionally, negotiation is not successful and the issue must be brought
before the courts to establish new precedents (e.g., as in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
case above). In other cases, an absence of formal legal or institutional direction leads
to the development of informal or ‘acquired’ customary rights. These are widely
accepted as legitimate and non-discriminatory despite having no formally established
legal authority (Ringius et al. 2002).
A third defining element of equity in shared resource conservation and management
addresses the social justice facet of resource burden and benefit allocation. This paper
is primarily concerned with the distributive aspects of social justice. However, the
authors note that this is only one of a number of relevant applications of social justice
worth exploring in relation to conservation issues. Indeed, some scholars argue that
the social justice dimension of equity should be the driving force and primary focus of
more effective conservation and management efforts (Hernes et al. 2005; Bundy et al.
2008).
Distributive justice supports the notion of ‘fair-sharing’, ‘equitable utilisation’ and
“fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1999). It is “concerned with the distribution of
the conditions and goods which affect individual well-being” (Deutsch 1975).
Distributive justice also guides the procedural relationship between the equity of a
decision-making process and the perceived equitability of its outcome; acting
equitably in this context may include procedural duties to notify and consult (Shelton
2007).
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It is not uncommon for equity and equality to be thought of as one and the same
(Bronfenbrenner 1973; Parson and Zeckhauser 1993; Shue 1999; Ringius et al. 2002).
While related, these concepts have some critical distinctions. Sovereign equality is a
basic principle of international law. In context, this principle recognises that all States
have both the sovereign right to exploit their domestic natural resources without
‘outside’ intervention and the responsibility to be ‘neighbourly’ by not abusing that
right and engaging in activities that result in harm to areas beyond their jurisdiction
(Shelton 2007).
Formal equality is an objective concept whereby the same unit of responsibility for
costs (or the same right to be protected from costs) is distributed evenly amongst all
stakeholders without discrimination (e.g., allocation per capita). Imposing equal units
of responsibility onto equal subjects of law may be judged as just in some contexts, but
it may not be socially just if the differences between these subjects are such that
disparities in individual (dis) advantage are exacerbated. An equitable approach in
such circumstances might entail “the appropriate treatment of unequals in view of the
differences between them” (Bronfenbrenner 1973), and seek substantive equality
between stakeholders through a range of mutually acceptable differentiating criteria.
A number of criteria have been identified by scholars as justification for differential
treatment in conservation cost and benefit allocation (Parson and Zeckhauser 1993);
these include capacity, need, entitlement, power, strict equality, ‘greatest good’, and
‘just desserts’ (Deutsch 1975; Rose et al. 1998; Ringius et al. 2002; Shelton 2007;
Soltau 2009; Dandy et al. 2014). More than one of these criteria may be relevant to a
given conservation issue and inform the application of equity decision rules and
management criteria. Need-based claims are a strong driver of distributive justice
norms in international law and policy (Deutsch 1975; Rawls 1999; Ringius et al. 2002).
These claims operate under the rationale that the use rights of some parties, or their
right to be protected from certain burdensome costs, might ‘justly’ warrant
prioritisation over those of others if doing so leads towards greater equality of
opportunity among stakeholders. Need-based claims illustrate the conceptual
difference between formal equality and equity in the just distribution of resource
burdens and benefits. It is in trying to address these differences in a way that is seen
as appropriate or ‘just’ to a given context that the procedural rules of distributional
equity are developed.

Equity: parameters and process
The presence of equity language in decades of international environmental
agreements and case law indicates that this multi-faceted concept plays an accepted,
established and widespread role in addressing shared resource conservation and
management challenges. From a governance perspective, therefore, the crux of the
current debate in resource policy does not lie in the principle itself but in how it is
applied. Resource stakeholder responsibilities, rights, and interests are complex,
political, and often at odds with each other – finding equitable approaches in such a
space is an understandable challenge. For example: who decides what ‘fair’ means in a
given burden or benefit distribution context and with what criteria and authority? A
more structured and consistent process that identifies the relevant parties and
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conservation goals, and then discusses the relevance and role of equity in resolving the
issue at hand could improve the transparency, accountability, and acceptance of
resource policy processes and conservation outcomes. Thomas Franck was a
proponent of this more procedural approach to conceptualising equity, concluding
that equity “captures in one word a process of discourse, reasoning, and
negotiation” (Franck 1995). Responsibility, rights, and distributive justice provide
important structural underpinnings to any such process.
This ‘equity process’ could be integrated into regular policy negotiation processes.
Requiring negotiating stakeholders to be accountable to basic procedural questions
nested within the conceptual framing elements of responsibility, rights, and
distributive justice could provide a more consistent and transparent means of
scrutinising both individual and collective stakeholder contributions to common
conservation goals (Fig. 1). Depending on the mechanisms and processes used to
solicit the required inputs in context, the end result of this more structured process
could help to clarify ‘true’ conservation barriers. This could mean that discrepancies
between expected principle (i.e., what is laid out and agreed to in international
agreements and customary law) and observed in practice (i.e., how States apply or
avoid applying these principles in their own interest) become clearer or it could help
reveal which ‘core subsystems’ are affecting each other vis à vis achieving individual
versus common goals (i.e., see Ostrom 2009). Such a process could also inform the
development of operational criteria for implementing equitable conservation and
management schemes.

Fig. 1
Conceptual procedural framework for supporting equitable approaches to
conservation and management. This framework process begins by defining a given
situation and clarifying its key elements using the framing parameters of
responsibility, rights, and distributive justice. The initial stage of this process explicitly
identifies who has a stake in the resource (i.e., who shares accountability for
outcomes), what freedoms they have with regard to resource use or protection (i.e., by
what right is a ‘stake’ asserted and on whose authority), and how the benefits or costs
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resulting from these freedoms are allocated. As key procedural decision-making
elements are discussed and clarified, the process is guided inwards towards a common
and situation-specific equitable approach

Equitable approaches in practice
With this conceptual framework in mind, the following section looks at two case
studies that are illustrative of the current tools being applied to more equitably
address transboundary conservation and management allocation challenges around
the world. Both the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC),
established to improve the conservation and management of transboundary fish
stocks, and the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), designed to
improve global air quality, have resource conservation and management frameworks
that incorporate relatively explicit distributional equity considerations into their
operational objectives. This section provides an overview of the conservation issue and
allocation challenge being addressed in each case study. It then provides an overview
of the management tools and supporting policies that have been selected to address
this challenge before focusing on how elements of responsibility, rights, and
distributive justice have shaped the way equity was applied in the pursuit of
conservation goals.

Regional oceanic fisheries: conservation requires
compromise
In the marine environment, international transboundary fisheries resources are
cooperatively managed through regional fisheries management organisations
(RFMOs). The structure, scope, and mandate of these RFMOs are established ‘by
contract’ through international treaties between States with a ‘real interest’ (i.e., a
broadly interpretable and non-exclusive stake; see Molenaar 2000) in a region’s
transboundary fisheries resources. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (LOSC) and the United Nations “Fish Stocks Agreement” (UNFSA) provide the
overarching legal framework and basis for the establishment of RFMOs and their
principles and standards for international fisheries governance (FAO 1999). No RFMO
is exactly the same, but all are additionally supported by a host of treaties,
conventions, and institutions that support regional cooperation among sovereign
States while pursuing the ‘higher goals’ of fisheries governance espoused in
international agreements.
At the most basic level, the right of State sovereign equality forms the basis of the
principles and standards established for the conservation, management and
exploitation of transboundary fisheries in RFMOs. This right, backed over time by
principles of international law and case precedent, allows a State the exclusive right of
privilege to undertake resource use activities in their own territory, to oblige other
States not to infringe upon this right against their will, and to require other States to
enter into contractual agreements to extend their rights into another State’s territory.
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The articulation of these sovereignty principles to include natural resources occurred
during a period of de-colonisation in the late 20th Century, when newly emergent
developing States sought to re-assert control over their territory’s natural resources
(United Nations 1962; Schrijver 1997; Triggs 2006).
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is the RFMO
responsible for the cooperative and sustainable management of transboundary
fisheries resources in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). The WCPO is
home to the world’s richest and largest tuna fisheries, with a record value of
approximately US$7.2 billion reported for 2012 (FFA Database 2013). Unlike the high
seas tuna fisheries in the marine ‘commons’ of other regions worldwide, the vast
majority of WCPO catches are harvested from waters under the sovereign jurisdiction
of Pacific Island States, Indonesia and the Philippines (FFA Database 2013). In effect,
the property rights over these transboundary tuna fisheries are predominantly shared
between a small number of developing coastal States. These coastal States then charge
access fees to foreign distant water fishing States (DWFNs) for the opportunity to
harvest fish within their waters (Hanich et al. 2010).
Conservation is increasingly a matter of concern in the WCPO as some tuna fisheries
are now threatened by overfishing and overcapacity (WCPFC 2013a). Given the
transboundary and migratory nature of tuna, unrestrained exploitation in a particular
national jurisdiction or on the high seas has the potential to significantly affect catches
elsewhere. This has potentially devastating consequences for developing island States
that are heavily dependent on the fisheries for revenue, development opportunities
and food security (Hanich et al. 2010). Given these concerns, it is necessary that
WCPO tuna fisheries are managed cooperatively throughout their range – both inside
waters under national jurisdiction and beyond into the high seas (Langley et al. 2009).
The WCPFC was established by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention
(hereafter WCPF Convention) upon its entry into force in 2004 (Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission 2000). The WCPFC is made up of over 40 coastal States
and DWFNs as well as a coordinating Secretariat. This RFMO holds a series of
scientific and technical meetings throughout the year to discuss different aspects of
WCPO fisheries management, with a primary focus on tuna. These meetings
culminate in a week-long annual regular session meeting where Members table,
debate, and approve or reject by consensus a wide range of legally-binding high seas
fisheries conservation and management measures (CMMs) for the coming few years.
The WCPF Convention builds on precedents in the LOSC, UNFSA and supplementary
agreements and provides the WCPFC with some guidance on principles for
‘distributively just’ allocations of fishing rights and responsibilities among its
members and ‘cooperative non-members’. Article 30 of the WCPF Convention, for
example, repeats Article 30 of UNFSA and requires that the WCPFC and its members
consider the special requirements of small island developing States (SIDS) when
developing CMMs. Additionally, it prescribes that the global community interest in the
conservation of fisheries should not result in a disproportionate burden of
conservation action on developing States (Juda 1997). The WCPFC’s relative youth has
allowed for the WCPF Convention to incorporate UNFSA language as well as ‘modern’
principles like ecosystem based management and participatory rights (Western and
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Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 2000). The incorporation of these principles
along with the Convention’s framework basis for decision-making have helped identify
the WCFC as one of the most successful RFMOs in terms of best practice (CullisSuzuki and Pauly 2010; Parris et al. 2010).
However, while the WCPF Convention and broader international fisheries law provide
some guidance on how different aspects of WCPO fisheries management might be
cooperatively and collectively considered, they are ambiguous in their guidance on the
practical operationalization of equitable fishing rights and responsibilities (Parris et
al. 2010). For example, there is no definition or clarity provided in the special needs
provisions of Article 30 to identify what a proportionate (i.e., equitable) distribution of
the conservation burden (or benefit) entails in practice. The distribution of a
disproportionate burden of conservation has been a repeated point of conflict and has
contributed to compliance issues between SIDS and other WCPFC parties in the
negotiation of new conservation and management measures (Parris et al. 2010;
Hanich 2012; Miller et al. 2014).
Efforts to address this disproportionate burden have thus far relied on the application
of numerous CMM exemption clauses. An exemption clause is a contractual
agreement that specifies the limits to a party’s liability. In the case of WCPFC tuna
CMMs, the obligation to observe prescribed catch and effort restrictions (e.g., catch
and capacity limits, seasonal and area closures, or limitations to setting on fish
aggregating devices) applies to some States but not others. For example, all WCPFC
States that fish bigeye tuna with longline gear have agreed annual catch limits;
however, SIDS and members catching less than 2000 tonnes in 2004 are exempt from
these limits (WCPFC 2013c).
Although these exemptions indicate a willingness among parties to consider and
address differentiated resource use rights based on capacity and need, their
application has thus far been at odds with both the best scientific advice provided for
decision-making and the pursuit of tuna conservation (Parris et al. 2010; Miller et al.
2014). There is extensive literature on the development of international fisheries
governance, the evolution of RFMOs, and their ongoing challenges to sustainably
manage transboundary fisheries. For further reading, selected examples of include:
Hey 1989; Kaye 2001; Henriksen et al. 2006; Lodge et al. 2007; Allen et al. 2010;
Grafton et al. 2010; and Russell and Vanderzwaag 2010.
Given current levels of overfishing in the WCPO, the complexity of the region’s fishing
interests, the concentration of these interests in waters under sovereign jurisdiction,
and the WCPFC’s jurisdictional limits over these waters (Parris et al. 2010; Hanich
2012), a sustainable practical solution will require that some or all States agree to
compromise some of their interests and carry some of the burden of conservation
efforts for the ostensible collective gain. This raises important questions of distributive
justice that are fundamental to conservation and management negotiations but are
currently unanswered. Take, for example, a situation where one group of
predominantly developed States will benefit from a conservation measure that will
ultimately rebuild certain tuna stocks. Should those States bear a greater share of the
conservation burden in comparison to other States who will also share some of the
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cost burden but receive little direct benefit? How should any compensation for
imposed burdens be calculated, or applied?
In the absence of any framework to address such questions, negotiations have failed to
successfully resolve the conflicting vested interests of WCPFC members. WCPFC
members have supported the need for compromise and an equitable approach in the
abstract, but have vigorously defended their vested individual interests in the heat of
negotiations (Hanich 2012; Miller et al. 2014).
In December 2013, the WCPFC adopted CMM 2013–06, a Conservation and
Management Measure on the Criteria for the Consideration of Conservation and
Management Proposals (WCPFC 2013b). This new measure requires WCPFC
members to apply specific questions to any conservation and management proposal to
determine the nature and extent of its impact of on SIDS and Territories. Among other
things, the WCPFC is now required to determine which States and Territories must
actually take action to implement a proposal, and which States and Territories would
be impacted by the proposal, in what way, and generally to what proportion. Critically,
however, WCPFC members have yet to implement a successful a framework for then
distributing any conservation burden beyond the broad principles articulated in
Article 30.
In December 2014, the WCPFC once again discussed these concerns, but again failed
to reach agreement at a meeting that was widely described as contentious and difficult
(Norris 2014; PEW 2014; Undercurrent News 2014). Some attempts were made to
propose potential processes but these did not receive sufficient support or clarity to
then resolve key conservation and management stalemates (Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission WCPFC 2014a; WCPFC 2014b; WCPFC 2014c). The
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency expanded upon their 2013 discussions,
clarified potential processes, and noted the different forms of potential conservation
burden that could occur, namely: 1) administrative burdens, whereby States may be
required to absorb unreasonable costs in order to implement a measure; and 2)
outcome burdens, whereby States lose revenue or other benefits as a result of a
conservation and management measure (WCPFC 2014c). Ultimately, however, the
WCPFC was unable adopt the measures necessary to reduce fishing mortality for
bigeye tuna to sustainable levels, due to a failure by members to reach agreement on
measures that would avoid disproportionate burdens of conservation action falling on
developing States.
While the WCPFC has made some progress towards identifying the tangible national
impacts of regional tuna fishing with greater transparency, no criteria have as of yet
been determined for assessing, or more equitably distributing, these impacts. To
overcome this current political impasse, it is evident that further dialogue is needed to
better define the responsibilities, rights, and distributive justice of burden and benefit
allocation (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2
Conceptual procedural framework for supporting equitable approaches to oceanic
tuna management in the WCPO

International climate change, the EU emissions
trading system, and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities
In counterpoint to the above case study, the field of global atmospheric pollution
abatement provides some of the longest-standing examples of how policymakers have
sought to incorporate equitable approaches into applied transboundary conservation
and management. Research and development into equitable international emissions
abatement policy arrangements was well underway prior to the existence of the 1997
Kyoto Protocol (e.g., UNAGBM 1995; Phylipsen et al. 1998). In 2005, following the
policy and negotiation groundwork laid by the Kyoto Protocol and the applied
successes of smaller domestic emissions trading schemes in the USA and Europe, the
EU implemented the EU ETS to reduce its emissions of human-caused greenhouse
gases (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; EC 2012).
The EU ETS is a decentralised and multilateral policy instrument of unprecedented
size that includes 31 member countries, more than 11,000 individual sources of
industrial pollution, and regulates 45 % of the EU’s total emissions (in billions of
tonnes) as of 2013 (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; EC 2012). While its emissions
allocation processes remain far from perfect (Tonn 2003; Ellerman and Buchner
2007; EC 2013), it has been nevertheless pioneering in many of its efforts to equitably
allocate the rights and responsibilities of international emissions burdens and
benefits.
The EU ETS is representative of a market-based ‘cap and trade’ instrument endorsed
by the widely-ratified United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) (UNFCCC 1994). The relative popularity of an ETS as a conservation tool
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comes from its capacity to limit access to a common-property resource through the
creation and allocation of private use rights, to shift the cost burden of pollution
control efforts from the controlling authority to the polluter, and to reconcile
seemingly incompatible economic growth and conservation objectives using a flexible
and transparent market-based operating framework (Tietenberg 2006).
ETSs require significant negotiation and cooperation among participants in order to
succeed in practice. While the argument could be made that this makes them
cumbersome and slow, the same could be said for any process requiring international
agreement to proceed. ETSs beneficially provide a framework and a platform to
identify and discuss the role of equitable approaches to conservation outcomes. In a
conventional cap-and-trade model framework, an overarching administrative body,
generally agreed upon by scheme participants, is given the responsibility of setting a
cap on existing emissions, establishing a trading market, and devising a set of
regulatory and distributive rules for allocating emissions rights based on this cap
(Tietenberg 2006; Rose and Wei 2008). These emissions rights are allocated among
participants as quota over some designated time frame (Rose and Wei 2008). These
quotas effectively represent the participants’ agreed-upon ‘rights’ to pollute as well as
delineate their individual responsibilities to observe a scheme’s prescribed limits and
processes so that participants act ‘justly’ in accordance with the collective desired
pollution abatement outcome.
Scope and scale aside, the EU ETS distinguishes itself from other existing cap and
trade systems in that it has yielded repeated, explicit, and consensus-driven
agreement on EU-wide and State-level emissions abatement targets over a
considerable period of time. Uniquely, this trading instrument is also supported by
separate complementary international burden sharing arrangements. The Burden
Sharing Agreement (BSA) for equitably fulfilling the EU-wide emissions cap (in effect
between 2008 and 2012) and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) for equitably
addressing additional state-level emitters (2013–2020) support the implementation of
this tool alongside other supporting multilateral agreements (EC 2012).
Also unusual in an international setting is the fact that the EU ETS emissions
allocation negotiations are all coordinated and enforced through a supervening
international authority – The European Commission (EC). While examples of similar
international cooperative management organisations exist (e.g., River basin
Commissions; regional fisheries management Organisations - see first case study), the
regulatory authority of the EC is far more extensive and integrated with State
governments; its enforcement capacity therefore remains effectively unmatched in
practice.
The EU ETS and its complementary policy tools come out of more than a decade of
international negotiation and discussion about how to appropriately address the
reduction in atmospheric emissions necessary to combat human-induced global
climate change (UNAGBM 1995; Phylipsen et al. 1998; Ringius et al. 2002; Ellerman
and Buchner 2007; EC 2012). The ‘equitable approach’ that emerged from these
extensive negotiations was the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
(Art. 3 (1), UNFCCC 1994). This overarching concept combines multiple equitable
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principles of rights and responsibility allocation; principles include formal and
sovereign equality, good neighbourliness, capacity, and need.
The UNFCCC text provides no guidance on the operationalization of this concept other
than developed countries “should take the lead” in combatting climate change and its
adverse effects (Art. 3 (1), UNFCCC 1994). However, the multi-criteria spirit of
common but differentiated responsibility is evident in some of the more distinctive
characteristics of the EU emissions cap-and-trade process. Through the initial
implementation of an EU-wide emissions cap, the EU ETS recognised that EU
Member States have equal sovereign rights and responsibilities over their internal
affairs while being simultaneously responsible as ‘good neighbours’ for collectively
addressing the transboundary problem of atmospheric pollution. However, the
application of differentiated caps also acknowledged the unequal capacities of
countries to effectively meet both individual and Europe-wide air quality conservation
targets (EC 2012). Capacity to contribute to emissions reduction was determined on
the basis of each member States’ financial capacity or ‘ability-to-pay’ to meet required
binding emissions abatement targets, or conversely, on its economic need to continue
to emit for the betterment of its baseline standard of living. Emissions quotas were
initially allocated freely on the basis of economic capacity and need and were
measured in terms of a given EU State’s relative indicator of ‘wealth’ (i.e., GDP) in a
baseline year. This differentiated burden allocation approach saw wealthy countries
such as Denmark voluntarily ‘take the lead’ and commit to a 20 % reduction in
emissions, while developing Bulgaria was permitted a 20 % increase in emissions (EC
2012).
Additional procedural equity provisions included in the EU ETS further distinguish it
from other cap and trade models. These include ‘new entrant’ and closure provisions
and the elimination of the precedent of merit-based ex post adjustments of emissions
allowance allocations based on positive performance (Ellerman and Buchner 2007).
Phase three of the scheme is phasing in auctioning as a means of allocating a
percentage of emissions permits and of adjusting the distribution of profits derived
from emissions trading (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; EC 2013).
Over time, the EU ETS has also distanced itself from customary sovereign rights-based
distribution practices such as ‘benchmarking’. In context, benchmarking multiplies
some index of historical activity or capacity by a uniform standard emissions rate to
allocate emissions quota rights on the basis of ‘inherent’ State sovereignty and
historical entitlement principles (Ellerman and Buchner 2007). Unlike a ‘use per
capita’ or proportional allocation approach based on formal equality principles,
international-scale historical entitlement rights can favour older and more capacityrich States in international negotiations by entrenching use rights for the heaviest
long-term users or polluters (Tonn 2003; Vaillancourt and Waaub 2004; Shelton
2007). Instead, the EU ETS allocates allowances at the individual factory level based
on each factory’s respective contribution to emissions within their sector (Ellerman
and Buchner 2007).
The effort to identify, discuss, and then apply equitable approaches in context are
reflected in the relative completeness of the conceptual procedural framework (Fig. 3).
This indicates that considerable critical dialogue has already taken place and that
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processes have been established to support equitable approaches to emissions
abatement. Additional dialogue could however be directed towards how framework
elements might change over time, what processes might also need to change in order
to remain equitable, and whether the goals driving these equitable approaches are
actually being met to satisfaction.

Fig. 3
Conceptual procedural framework for supporting equitable approaches to CO2
emissions abatement schemes in the EU
Despite the many distinct incorporations of equity into the EU ETS and its decadeslong ability to sustain cooperative international discourse, this instrument’s overall
success at meeting overarching atmospheric conservation goals is the subject of debate
and criticism. Key criticisms include a lack of ambition over overall abatement targets,
poorly-executed initial permit allocations leading to poor market performance,
overuse of exemptions, and system vulnerabilities to political interference (Tonn
2003; Ellerman and Buchner 2007; IPCC 2007). Concerns over the overall equitability
of the EU ETS approach also remain. The USA and Canada, for example, remain
resistant to the implementation of a more globalised emissions trading scheme,
arguing that some countries will get off too easy while their own costs of abatement
action will be too high (Bush 2001; Environment Canada 2011).

Lessons learned and implications for
equitable approaches to transboundary
marine fisheries management
The two case studies above are representative of a growing recognition that an
appropriate treatment of equity is an essential part of overcoming the human barriers
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to effective transboundary resource conservation and management in both terrestrial
and marine environments (Rose et al. 1998; Shue 1999; Ringius et al. 2002; Tonn
2003; Hernes et al. 2005; Soltau 2009; Sommerville et al. 2010). In order to reach
conservation goals, transboundary conservation schemes both within and between
States must tackle a challenging combination of factors at different scales of
governance, geography, and time. These factors include multiple jurisdictions, joint
management, diverse interests, and asymmetric power, capacity, and need. The
diverse rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders in context, as well as their
different perspectives on what constitutes a just distribution of conservation benefits
and burdens adds an additional layer of complexity to this challenge. This decisionmaking environment means that conservation solutions must necessarily be
cooperative, consensus-driven, and as transparent as possible.
This analysis has chosen to explore how such challenges might be better addressed
within the existing framework of international policy and law; however, alternative
approaches, like the social justice-centric approaches of Hernes et al. (2005) and
Bundy et al. (2008), are equally worth exploring. The key message in undertaking
these analyses is that more innovative thinking is required to more successfully
address the transboundary conservation challenges of the day, and that equitable
approaches must play a role in this success.
Regional marine fisheries in the WCPO and atmospheric GHG emissions in the EU are
physically different resources, with different geographies, stakeholders, and subnational policy pathways for the implementation of compatible measures. Indeed,
further critical analysis is needed to address the horizontal and vertical governance
challenges of implementing more equitable approaches into compatible sovereign
State measures. At the international level, however, many of the conservation
challenges of these two resources, and the way decision-makers are trying to address
these equitably through existing international law and policy frameworks, share some
striking similarities.
Here, we address four of these similarities: 1) In both cases, there are overarching
international legal agreements and precedents that can inform the general
understanding and use of equitable concepts in transboundary conservation and
management; 2) Both face challenges to the operationalization of these concepts due
to insufficient guidance by these same agreements and precedents, as well as by the
selected conservation tool; 3) Both rely on regional governance arrangements to
coordinate the activities and actions of sovereign States and to provide a consensusdriven forum to address common goals and issues; 4) Both incorporate equitable
principles into their different conservation schemes; despite this, both still face key
difficulties in adequately addressing willingness and ability to pay for conservation.
With regard to the first similarity, applications of equitable concepts in international
law have persisted for decades despite the strong debate over and lack of ‘unifying’
definition for equity. These precedents, such as the principles of good neighbourliness,
sovereign equality, and ability-to-pay, as well as international legal precedents relating
to watercourse use, fisheries jurisdiction, and maritime boundaries establish a
template for equitable transboundary resource benefit distribution across diverse
stakeholders and under a number of different scenarios.
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However, as the second similarity indicates, there remains a critical divide between
intent and outcome in these two different transboundary resources. This highlights a
need for both resource use stakeholder groups to actively engage more meaningfully
with each other to clarify roles, responsibilities, and rights of conservation action in
context. This engagement must also consider a mixed, multi-principled approach to
equity that adequately accounts for differing perspectives on distributive justice.
Cooperative development of consistent decision-making processes (e.g., such as Fig. 1)
that identify the ‘boundaries’ of equity in a given context could help avoid the
endorsement and application of inadequate or contradictory principles that lead to
inequitable (or non-existent) conservation outcomes in practice.
The limited fisheries conservation outcomes in the WCPFC provide an example of
what can happen when internationally-accepted equity principles are applied
selectively to individual advantage and without adequate dialogue or process. Distant
water fishing States continue to push for sovereignty-based allocations of harvest
rights or vessel limits based on entitlement and historical activities. This occurs
despite practical evidence that this approach functionally discriminates against the
interests of the developing States that they are obliged to consider under international
law (Hanich and Ota 2013).
In contrast, despite the clear difficulties the EU ETS has faced in effectively
implementing the market-based component of its conservation scheme, its
conservation burden sharing negotiations remain some of the most comprehensive
and transparently inclusive of differentiated, ‘unequal’ participating stakeholders in
international transboundary resources policy. These negotiations were framed in the
spirit of common but differentiated responsibilities, which critically recognizes that
capacity and need are major drivers of perceptions of ‘fairness’ over historical
entitlement in this context, and that addressing these factors appropriately has played
a key role in encouraging sustained, shared contributions to collective conservation
outcomes. However, in operationalising the outcomes of this further dialogue and
negotiation, it will also be important to consider how applied equity considerations
might affect overarching conservation goals. For example, both conservation schemes
currently use policy exemption clauses to address stakeholder capacity and need
concerns. In the WCPFC, these exemptions are identified as a barrier to effective
conservation because the exempted development actions of some States have not been
compatible with conservation-driven caps on fleet capacity (Parris et al. 2010).
The third similarity notes the presence of regional governance arrangements to
coordinate the activities and actions of sovereign States and to provide a consensusdriven forum to address common goals and issues. In addition to being supported by
the diverse stakeholders themselves, equitable approaches to conservation also rely on
a complex interaction of domestic and international support from institutional,
political, and financial structures. An overarching mediating authority provides the
‘common ground’ and guidance necessary for addressing “institutional
ambiguities” (van Tatenhove 2013) and what Wallace (2000) describes as a “swinging
governance pendulum” of supranational, intergovernmental, and national arenas.
Regional arrangements also provide a platform to create regulatory policies that
clarify the overarching rights and responsibilities of current participants as well as of
potential future new entrants. It is worth considering if these particular schemes
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would have succeeded to the extent that they did without the support of such regional
structures.
The fourth similarity between the WCPFC and EU ETS case studies is that an
appropriate treatment of willingness and ability to pay remain a key stumbling block
to the successful realisation of desired conservation outcomes. This is despite efforts
to incorporate equitable approaches into both conservation scheme frameworks. The
capacity and will of stakeholders to act in a prescribed way for the common benefit
while taking on individual costs is critical to the ultimate success of conservation
schemes. In most cases, a developing country will simply not have the same capacity
to pay for remediation, abatement, and compensation costs as a developed country
regardless of its contribution to the problem or level of enthusiasm for a shared
conservation goal. This issue of capacity is why developed States are given a more
explicit responsibility to ‘take the lead’ in addressing shared conservation challenges
in international law.
With regard to will, those being asked to take on the costs of conservation must have a
sufficient ownership of the perceived problem in order for cooperative conservation
schemes to attract the necessary support, or willingness-to-pay, for successful actions
and outcomes (Spiteri and Nepal 2006; Wunder 2007). This ownership is linked to
the effective establishment of rights, not just in the sense of physical property
boundaries, but also in the deliberation of responsibility for burden and benefit
distribution. If the push for action is not sufficiently demanded, developed, and
endorsed by those potentially affected, then the very presence of some conservation
schemes may be considered inequitable and yield outcomes with little net
conservation benefit (Wunder 2006; Gross-Camp et al. 2012).
Moreover, if the benefits of conservation are expected to flow largely to one
stakeholder group, then other stakeholders will have little willingness to carry a
conservation burden. In this regard, the WCPFC tuna fisheries continue to struggle
with achieving the necessary catch reductions in the face of divergent stakeholder
interests and dramatically unequal benefit flows (Hanich 2012). WCPFC participants
evidently do not have a uniform relationship with the given resource, and their
willingness to act therefore differs according to their different opportunity costs.
Issues of willingness-to-pay as a barrier to effective conservation outcomes have been
explored at length in the terrestrial payment for ecosystem services (PES) literature
(Spiteri and Nepal 2006; Wunder 2006, 2007; Börner et al. 2010; Gross-Camp et al.
2012).
Even when there is sufficient willingness to pay among stakeholders to drive
conservation action, both the above case studies and examples in PES literature
indicate that a successful transboundary conservation scheme should also be
accompanied by appropriate institutional, regulatory, and financial support
mechanisms (Börner et al. 2010; Clements et al. 2010). These support mechanisms
contribute to the perceived value and equity of conservation service delivery (Spiteri
and Nepal 2006). In this regard, voluntary and compensation-based conservation
schemes have generally been viewed as more equitable at least in transboundary
terrestrial conservation contexts (Wunder 2006).
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This analysis of two case studies does not claim to represent the complete range of
issues faced by transboundary resource managers. However, their similarities indicate
that they are representative of many of these issues; as a result they yield some
broadly relevant insights to transboundary resource conservation in general. With
regards to transboundary marine fisheries, however, what are some of the relevant
takeaway lessons to help inform more effective and equitable conservation policies?
First, if the complexity of equity issues in both case studies is indicative of
transboundary conservation issues more generally, the successful conservation and
management of highly migratory and shared transboundary fish stocks will require a
mixed but coordinated approach to operationalising equity more broadly into practice.
This mixed approach will likely need to include a combination of binding and
voluntary management measures to account for State sovereignty rights while
encouraging “willingness-to-pay” compliance. Such approaches will first need to
engage more strongly and transparently in marine policy discussions that clarify the
rights and responsibilities of unequal stakeholders in a “common but differentiated”
way. These conversations have begun in the WCPFC in their implementation of
WCPFC 2013–06 and exemption clauses, but the first is incomplete, and the second as
currently applied is arguably undermining overarching conservation goals. The
WCPFC, as well as other RFMOs, may wish to consider how creating a separate
burden sharing arrangement process, such as was undertaken for the EU ETS, might
be helpful in separating out some of the technical conservation decisions from the
political ones.
Second, regional institutions like the EC and RFMOs (and others like transboundary
river basin authorities) provide an arguably indispensable common platform for more
integrated ‘common ground’ in a complex legal and governance environment.
Regional institutions not only provide the framework for transparent supervening
guidance in a complex and dynamic decision-making environment, they are also
capable of pooling together stakeholder competencies and decision-making processes
in an otherwise fragmented international policy arena (van Tatenhove 2013). While
RFMOs have received criticism for their lack of effectiveness in delivering on
overarching conservation goals (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010), it is worth speculating
how far international transboundary fisheries management and conservation would
get without these institutions.
The reality of managing transboundary fisheries, or any transboundary resource for
that matter, is that difficult and contentious decisions will need to be made by those
tasked with the responsibility of conservation decision-making. Effective conservation
actions imply trade-offs, with greater costs borne by current generations for the
potential benefit of future ones. Conflicts over shared resource use and barriers to
conservation are likely to persist without greater collective efforts to define, and then
respond to, the key elements of responsibility, rights, and distributive justice that
successfully drive equitable conservation and management in both terrestrial and
marine environments. This paper illustrates that even without a concise definition of
equity, the precedents and tools already exist to generate more equitable solutions to
shared resource use problems. Developing and negotiating the necessary refinements
for greater success in transboundary fisheries management is indeed well within our
collective capacity.
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